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DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF LOW GLOBAL INFLATION RATES
The authors of this article are Juan Carlos Berganza and Pedro del Río, from the Associate Directorate General 
International Affairs, and Fructuoso Borrallo, from the European Central Bank.1
This article firstly gives an overview of how global inflation has evolved in recent years, 
during which it has followed a generally downward trend. Inflation has often been low, and 
even negative, and has fallen short of central banks’ targets despite the adoption of 
unconventional monetary policy measures to achieve the desired stimulus. The decline 
steepened in mid‑2014, coinciding with the collapse in the oil price, although it also 
extended to core rates. This article explores what domestic and external factors could 
explain this behaviour, and the possible existence of changes in fundamental relationships 
between the underlying variables in the main developed economies. It also discusses the 
possible economic consequences of an extended period of excessively low inflation rates, 
and the implications for economic policy highlighted in the economic literature.
Over the past five years the world has witnessed an almost universal trend towards lower 
inflation rates, with rates often falling short of central bank targets. The decline steepened 
in mid-2014 with the oil-price slump, such that inflation rates in the main advanced 
economies dropped to extremely low – and in some cases negative – levels. This behaviour 
appears to be at odds with the context of moderate economic recovery and accommodative 
monetary policy that has prevailed in recent years. It also contrasts with inflation’s 
downward rigidity in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, given the depth and 
duration of the recession (so-called “missing disinflation”).2 It is therefore worth asking 
what factors may be driving this recent behaviour in consumer prices.
One possible explanation is that inflation has been linked to transitory factors, such as the 
drop in prices of oil and other commodities in the last year and a half. However, the drop 
in inflation is also apparent in the underlying rates, which ought to be less affected by 
these factors. Therefore, alternative explanations have been put forward that operate 
through structural changes in the price formation process. One possibility is that the 
relationship between inflation and its domestic determinants has changed. This is not new. 
For example, in many advanced economies, it is well documented that inflation’s cyclical 
sensitivity on a downward trend up until the early nineties, with the growing relative 
importance of inflation targets, thanks to the credibility central banks had achieved. Global 
factors may also have become more important in determining domestic prices, due to the 
closer integration of global product and factor markets, increasing inflation’s sensitivity to 
the degree of slack in the global economy.
Whatever the case, low inflation rates can have harmful effects for economies. For 
instance they can lead to undesirable tightening of monetary conditions, with higher 
real interest rates, if monetary policy cannot lower nominal rates sufficiently. Meanwhile, 
lower inflation has a negative impact on public and private debt dynamics, as it makes 
Introduction
1  This article is a summary of the following paper: Berganza, Borrallo and del Río (2016), “Determinants and 
implications of low global inflation”, Documento Ocasional, n.º 2016, Banco de España.
2  Ball and Mazumder (2011) indicate that, in the case of the United States, according to historical models, core 
inflation should have fallen more in the period 2008-2010 (to rates below –3 %, when it only reached 0.6 %). The 
historical evidence suggests that pronounced and persistent negative output gaps tend to lead to significant 
disinflation in terms of both prices and wages [see Meier (2010)].
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deleveraging more difficult. It also exacerbates the process of internal devaluation in 
monetary union member countries that need to restore their competitiveness. In extreme 
cases, there can be a de-anchoring of agents’ inflation expectations, with the 
consequent risk of falling into a deflationary spiral. This also has a negative impact on 
central banks’ credibility.
This article firstly gives an overview of how global inflation has evolved in recent years, 
distinguishing between different economic areas. The possible factors explaining why 
prices have behaved in this way are then analysed using the Phillips curve approach. The 
potential economic consequences of excessively low inflation rates are then explored, 
along with the associated economic policy implications discussed in the economic 
literature. Finally, the main conclusions are set out.
The global inflation rate has fluctuated widely over the past decade. After climbing to over 
5% before the crisis, partly driven by a surge in energy prices, it fell to levels barely above 
0% in the wake of the crisis. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, this drop was smaller 
than predicted by the most widely used models, given the severity and duration of the 
recession. A gradual recovery began in mid-2009, with inflation reaching 4% in mid-2011, 
before returning to its downward trend, and dropping to 1% at end-2015. It has since been 
gradually increasing, and currently stands at 1.6%. The global core rate – which excludes 
the more volatile energy and unprocessed food prices – dropped from 3.4% to 1.2% 
during the crisis, and after a partial upturn, it dropped back to 1.3% at the end of 2015, 
and is currently 2% (see Chart 1).3 It is noteworthy that within core inflation the prices of 
services and manufactured goods have performed differently. Inflation rates for 
manufactured goods have tended to be negative over the last two years, whereas those of 
services have stayed higher.4
Cross-country analysis shows how inflation rates have been on a downward trend over the 
past five years in the main advanced economies (see Charts 2.1 and 2.3), often falling 
short of central bank targets. This has also been the case with core inflation. Indeed, 
headline inflation in this set of economies was negative in early 2015. In some cases, such 
as the euro area, inflation has remained at levels close to zero since then, while core 
inflation rates have remained below 1%. Only in the case of the United States, which is 
further in to the economic cycle, is the core inflation rate above 2%. In Japan, headline 
inflation picked up to rates close to 2.5% in mid-2014 due to an increase in the consumption 
tax rate, but subsequently returned to negative values. Inflation is also rising in the United 
Kingdom, but this is largely associated with the depreciation of sterling following the result 
of the referendum on EU membership.
Emerging economies have also experienced a downward trend in inflation, but always at 
levels exceeding the global average. Moreover, there has been a wider range of variation 
between countries in the case of the emerging economies than among the advanced 
economies (see Charts 2.2 and 2.4). While in some cases rates have been very low 
(particularly in the new EU Member States, and some emerging Asian economies, such as 
China and Korea), in others such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia and Turkey, inflation 
rates have remained high, partly as a result of currency depreciation.
Recent global trends  
in inflation
3  The global inflation rate has been constructed from a sample of 27 countries, accounting for 80% of global GDP.
4  However, in some cases, such as the United States, the moderation of services inflation is surprising when 
compared to other recoveries. This could be due to trends in health-care prices resulting from recent legislation 
in the country.
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This article therefore focuses on identifying the underlying reasons for the advanced 
economies’ low inflation rates in recent years.
The standard framework for modelling inflation is the Phillips curve, according to which 
inflation (πt) is basically determined by agents’ expectations. As Ball and Mazumder (2011) 
suggest, these expectations may have backward-looking π’t and forward-looking LTt 
components. It is also affected by the degree of cyclical slack in the economy (slackt), 
such that, more idle productive resources would be associated with a lower inflation rate.
   πt = λLTt + (1 – λ)π’t + ß1slackt + εt          [1]
In this framework, low inflation could be explained by greater relative slack in the economy 
and/or agents’ lower inflation expectations.
However, the analysis based on the Phillips curve has its limitations and remains 
controversial among economists.5 To start with, the degree of slack in the economy cannot 
Determinants of inflation
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SOURCES: Datastreram, national statistics, OECD, and Banco de España.
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Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and 
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b Core inflation excludes food and energy.
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5  See, for example, Constâncio (2015) or Yellen (2015).
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be directly observed but has to be estimated, which is particularly complicated in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. Secondly, changes have been detected in the model’s 
parameters in the past (both those measuring inflation’s sensitivity to the cyclical position 
and those approximating the contribution of the prospective component relating to inflation 
expectations), and they could have changed again now. Moreover, this theoretical 
framework usually has to be backed up with other factors that are relevant to price 
determination, such as indirect taxes and demographic changes.
In the case of an open economy, the Phillips curve models need to factor in the effects of 
the exchange rate and prices of imported inputs (including raw materials) and finished 
goods, which are also a part of agents’ consumption basket. This is precisely the approach 
taken in this study, such that expression [1] has an additional term (impt), which captures 
relative import prices:
   πt = λLTt + (1 – λ)π’t + ß1slackt + ß2impt        [2]
Some authors have also highlighted the possibility that, as a result of the globalisation 
process, inflation depends less at present on each economy’s position in the cycle 
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and more on the degree of global economic slack, this effect being in addition to that 
of import prices.6
These factors are examined in more detail below, starting with those that are, in principle, 
transitory, followed by those that are more structural. To this end, an extensive literature 
regarding this matter has been reviewed and an empirical exercise conducted, focusing on 
estimating equation [2] for the main developed economies, and analysing possible changes 
in the model’s parameters before and after the global financial crisis.
It is clear that trends in commodity prices, particularly the oil price, have been among the 
main factors in the recent drop in inflation around the world (see Charts 3.1 and 3.2). 
Overall, the energy and foods components have accounted for 85% of the drop in 
inflation in the United States, 60% in the euro area, and 90% in Japan. The direct effects 
of softer commodity prices differed between countries, depending on their weight in the 
CPI basket, changes in exchange rates, the unit tax burden on these goods, and changes 
in energy taxes and subsidies. For example, the oil price has fallen less in economies 
whose currencies have depreciated against the dollar over this period. Moreover, the 
drop in the energy component of the CPI in the EU was smaller than in the United States 
as a result of the heavier tax burden in European countries.7 As regards the possible 
indirect effects of changes in commodity prices, there is considerable evidence that the 
degree of pass-through of these changes into core inflation has diminished over the past 
three decades, as a result of less intensive raw material use and the greater credibility of 
the monetary authorities.8
Exchange rate changes also explain a significant portion of inflation in the various countries, 
as shown by the negative correlation between inflation rates and changes in the nominal 
effective exchange rate in recent years (see Chart 3.3). Some economies have experienced 
substantial depreciation in their exchange rate and an upturn in inflation. These include 
Japan, following the implementation of the series of economic policy measures referred to 
as Abenomics, and the United Kingdom, following the global financial crisis and, more 
recently, in the wake of the referendum on EU membership. Other economies whose 
currencies have appreciated, such as Switzerland, the United States and, more recently, 
Japan, have experienced downward pressure on inflation via this channel. Nevertheless, 
as with commodity prices, there is evidence in the literature that the extent to which 
exchange rate changes are passed through into inflation has decreased in recent decades.9 
This decline in pass-through is due to stronger inflation-expectation anchoring and the 
development of global production chains that enable multinationals to absorb exchange 
rate shifts better.
In any event, the low levels of inflation witnessed in recent years cannot be explained 
solely by fluctuations in exchange rates or commodity prices. Other factors, some of which 
are more permanent, have played a significant role in the price formation process. These 
possible determinants are discussed in the following sections, always from within the 
conceptual framework of the Phillips curve.
THE EFFECT OF COMMODITY 
PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES
6  See BIS (2014).
7  In the case of some emerging economies, such as Brazil and Indonesia, subsidy cuts have caused an effective 
rise in fuel costs.
8  See, for example, Blanchard and Galí (2010).
9  See, for example Campa and Goldberg (2005) or BIS (2014). However, Forbes et al. (2015) found pass-through 
to have increased in the United Kingdom since the crisis and highlight the extent to which pass-through differs 
according to the source of the exchange rate movement.
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A high degree of slack in the economy is a typical driver of low inflation. The output gap, 
which is defined as the difference between observed and potential GDP, is usually taken 
as a proxy for economic slack, although the unemployment gap, which is defined as the 
difference between the unemployment rate and the non-accelerating-inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU), may also be used. The output gap and unemployment gap 
estimates are subject to uncertainty as they include non-observable variables. The 
statistical relationship that has historically linked changes in these two variables, known 
as Okun’s law, also seems to have changed in some economies. For example, in the 
United States, in recent years, some of the fundamental labour market variables, such as 
participation rates, unemployment rates, and long-term unemployment rates, have 
behaved in ways out of keeping with historical trends. This suggests that structural 
changes may have taken place in the labour market and/or in the relationships between 
the various economic variables.10 In any event, the estimates available from various 
international organisations suggest that although there is a significant degree of 
economic slack in the main advanced economies, in most cases it has been shrinking. 
CHANGES IN THE CYCLICAL 
SENSITIVITY OF INFLATION 
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10  For a detailed analysis of recent trends in the U.S. labour market, see Berganza (2014).
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This reduction contrasts with the increasing moderation in inflation rates discussed in 
the previous section.
The fact that inflation rates have not responded as expected to economies’ cyclical 
position in recent years is not entirely new. There is extensive empirical evidence that the 
Phillips curve flattened between the seventies and the early nineties in the advanced 
economies,11 as can be seen in Chart 4. However, there is also considerable evidence that 
this flattening of the Phillips curve has been reversed in some advanced economies since 
the crisis – such as Spain and Italy12 – following the implementation of certain structural 
reforms and labour-market deregulation.
In the case of wages, over the last few years less growth has been seen than in previous 
recoveries, even bearing in mind the low rates of inflation registered. There may be various 
reasons for this. Firstly, it could indicate that labour market conditions are weaker than the 
unemployment rate would suggest. Moreover, the productivity gains seen in recent years 
have been small and in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, job losses during the 
crisis and job growth during the recovery have been concentrated in sectors characterised 
by lower pay and productivity. Another explanation, popularised by the chair of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at Jackson Hole in 2014 [Yellen (2014)], was 
the concept of “pent-up wage deflation”.13 On this hypothesis, the (supposed) reluctance 
of workers to accept cuts in nominal wages in recessionary periods or at the start of the 
expansion14 would have held real wages above equilibrium levels for a large share of 
workers. The subsequent drop in unemployment during the expansion would thus have 
reduced the slack in the labour market without pushing up wages.
Another interesting feature of price determination related to the reduced cyclical sensitivity 
of inflation is that the relationship between wage growth and inflation seems to have 
broken down in some advanced economies.15 As Charts 4.3 and 4.4 show, in the economies 
of the United States and the United Kingdom this relationship was relatively close in the 
seventies and eighties, whereas inflation seems to have become less sensitive to changes 
in wages since the nineties. One possible explanation for this phenomenon would be the 
countercyclical behaviour of profit margins, which would compensate for changes in 
wages, thereby reducing inflation’s sensitivity to labour market conditions. Thus, increased 
profit margins in some economies in the wake of the Great Recession may have led to 
inflation’s becoming less responsive to downward wage pressures. The financial crisis 
could have intensified this pattern, as the countercyclical behaviour of margins is more 
pronounced in the presence of financial constraints.16
Other studies attribute inflation’s reduced sensitivity to internal cyclical conditions to 
globalisation, which would have increased the importance of factors such as the global 
output gap or import prices.17 By expanding the range of goods and services traded 
internationally, globalisation has pushed down prices of traded goods, given the lower 
production costs in economies – such as China’s – that have come to play a bigger part in 
11  See IMF (2013), BIS (2014) or Blanchard et al. (2015). 
12  See, for example, Álvarez and Urtasun (2013), Riggi and Venditti (2014), Banco de España (2015) or IMF (2016).
13  See, for example, Daly and Hobjin (2014).
14  There is extensive evidence of these downward rigidities in nominal wages (see, for example, Benigno and Ricci 
(2011), or Linder et al. (2012)].
15  See, for example, Yellen (2015).
16  As recently proposed by Gilchrist et al. (2015).
17  See, for example, IMF (2013, 2016) or BIS (2014).
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world trade. Globalisation has also had an impact on the degree of international 
competition, affecting workers’ bargaining power and businesses’ profit margins.
The increased importance of global factors would be consistent with the trend towards 
greater synchronisation of inflation and wage growth rates in the advanced economies in 
recent years. However, even if we accept that global factors are playing a bigger role in 
shaping inflation, there is considerable uncertainty as to how relevant they are in explaining 
the recent drop in inflation (or low inflation before the global financial crisis).18 Over the longer 
term, it is worth discussing the extent to which globalisation will continue to exert downward 
pressure on inflation, as differences in labour costs between countries tend to narrow.
Another possible explanation given in the literature for inflation’s reduced cyclical sensitivity 
is the firmer anchoring of agents’ inflation expectations on central banks’ targets and the 
increased significance of this factor in price and wage setting.19 If agents remain confident 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INFLATION 
EXPECTATIONS
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18  See, for example Rogoff (2006) or Bernanke (2007).
19  See, for example, IMF (2013), BIS (2014) or Yellen (2015).
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that central banks are committed to price stability, they will attach less importance to 
transient deviations in inflation and the cyclical pressures on inflation will be more muted. 
The greater stability of inflation in recent decades, and its resistance to dropping further 
during the financial crisis, would be consistent with expectation anchoring’s playing a 
bigger role. Studies analysing how the parameters of the Phillips curve have developed 
over time tend to confirm that the inflation expectation coefficient has increased.20
As short-term expectations tend to be more volatile and more responsive to current trends 
in inflation, it is particularly important that long term inflation expectations remain anchored. 
As Yellen (2015) shows, the medium-term effect on inflation of transitory factors (such as 
energy prices or the degree of economic slack) depends on whether long-term expectations 
are affected or not. In recent decades, long-term expectations have remained much more 
stable and have barely been affected by the changes observed in inflation. However, the 
drop in inflation in the recent recovery does seem to have caused a downward shift in 
medium- and long-term inflation expectations in developed economies (see Charts 5.1 
and 5.2).
Indeed, long-term expectations, particularly when these are measured based on market 
instruments, have become more closely correlated with observed inflation in the advanced 
economies since the financial crisis.21 A closer correlation has also been seen between 
inflation expectations and oil prices, particularly in low-growth economies with persistently 
sub-target inflation and official interest rates close to the lower bound (see Charts 5.3 and 
5.4). Along the same lines, a recent IMF study [IMF (2016)] on low inflation rates found that 
the long-term inflation expectations coefficient had decreased and the role of past 
expectations, and hence the persistence of past expectations, had increased since the 
crisis. The same study found the sensitivity of medium- and long-term inflation expectations 
to inflation and oil price surprises to have risen in those advanced economies with monetary 
policies constrained by the lower effective bound on official interest rates. These 
phenomena, which until recently had only been observed in exceptional cases, such as 
Japan,22 point to a reduced anchoring of inflation expectations and the possibility that 
transitory factors, such as oil price changes, have second round effects, which is a matter 
of concern for the monetary authorities.
In order to gauge whether inflation’s response to the various variables discussed above 
has changed since the crisis, a series of regressions have been estimated for a group of 
developed economies. The estimates are based on the standard model of the Phillips 
curve as specified in equation [2]. In this framework, inflation (πt) is approximated by its 
core component, the forward-looking part of inflation expectations (LTt) by the consensus 
of analysts’ forecasts or the central bank’s inflation target; the backward looking part (π’t) 
by average core inflation over the last four quarters; the degree of cyclical slack in the 
economies (slackt) by the difference between NAIRU and the unemployment rate observed 
(NAIRU gap)23; and relative import prices (impt) by the difference between inflation on 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
DETERMINANTS OF INFLATION
20  See IMF (2013) or Blanchard et al. (2015).
21  The limitations of measures of inflation expectations derived from financial instruments (such as the existence 
of liquidity premiums) must be borne in mind, while, by contrast, expectations reported in surveys have 
remained much more stable. In any case, Lyziak and Paloviita (2016) find that following the crisis, long-term 
inflation expectations in the euro area, as reported by professional analysts and consumer surveys, have also 
become more sensitive to short-term inflation forecasts and inflation trends.
22  In a recent analysis of its monetary policy strategy, the Bank of Japan indicated that one of the main causes of 
persistently low inflation is the adaptive or backward looking nature of inflation expectations [see Bank of Japan 
(2016)].
23  This approach means the sign of the (ß1) parameter (the cyclical sensitivity rate) can be expected to be negative.
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imported goods and core inflation. In all the regressions the sum of the coefficients of both 
components of inflation expectations (backward and forward looking) is set to unity to 
ensure that inflation does not affect the real variables over the long term.
As mentioned, the aim of this exercise was to confirm whether the way the various variables 
respond to inflation has changed following the crisis. Two estimates were made for each 
country considered: the first for the period between the first quarter of 199724 and the 
fourth quarter of 2007, and the second for the period between the first quarter of 2008 and 
the third quarter of 2015. In a similar way to other recent studies, the results obtained show 
a high degree of heterogeneity and in some cases, they lack robustness to alternative 
specifications. As a result, it cannot be concluded that the changes in inflation’s sensitivity 
to any of its determinants has played a general role in the low inflation observed. It may 
have done so in specific countries, but not overall. 
Chart 6.1 shows the coefficients estimated for the forward-looking component of inflation 
expectations. As can be seen, there is considerable heterogeneity: in some cases (those 
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lying above the 45º line), the importance of the forward-looking component of expectations 
increased relative to that of the backward looking component in the second period. In 
other cases (those below the 45º line), the opposite was observed. Indeed, the coefficients 
of both periods are only statistically different in in few cases. Chart 6.2 shows the estimated 
coefficients for the cyclical sensitivity of inflation in the two periods considered. The 
countries below the 45º line are those for which an increase in the cyclical sensitivity of 
inflation has been estimated in the most recent period. The countries above the line are 
those for which sensitivity is estimated to have decreased. A wide degree of variation 
between countries is again observed. Moreover, the results are not robust to changes in 
the specification of the backward-looking component of inflation expectations. Lastly, the 
results obtained for the import price coefficient also present a high degree of heterogeneity 
and limited robustness.
Given the heterogeneity of the overall results, a more country-specific approach is taken 
in Charts 6.3 and 6.4, which show the results obtained for the factors determining 
inflation in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the case of the United States, 
the greater importance of the forward-looking component of inflation expectations as a 
factor explaining inflation after 2008 stands out, along with the contribution of cyclical 
economic slack in reducing core inflation since the onset of the crisis, although with 
decreasing intensity since end-2010. According to this breakdown, as the cyclical slack 
reduces, if agents’ expectations remain anchored and there are no further significant 
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drops in import prices,25 core inflation can be expected to converge on the Federal 
Reserve’s inflation target. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the forward-looking component of inflation expectations 
also became more significant in the post-crisis period, highlighting the importance of 
keeping inflation expectations anchored to the inflation target. The degree of slack in the 
economy has not proven to be significant in the various estimates made. Moreover, the 
estimated sign is the opposite both of that suggested by economic theory and found in the 
majority of countries. It is worth noting that other studies26 obtained the same results in the 
specific case of the United Kingdom. The results for the other countries [see Berganza et 
al. (2016)] show that that in some cases the post-crisis drop in inflation may be associated 
with past inflation having more influence on expectations (such as in the euro area or 
Japan), although these findings need to be taken with due caution, given the empirical 
difficulties inherent in these estimates.
A context of excessively low inflation poses various risks. Unless they are accompanied by 
correspondingly low interest rates, ultra-low inflation rates entail an increase in real interest 
rates, tightening monetary and financial conditions and weakening demand. Moreover, in 
the present context of high public and private indebtedness in many countries, lower 
inflation makes deleveraging more difficult, as past debt remains constant rather than 
being devalued by current inflation. Indeed, Svensson (2015) shows empirically how an 
economy such as Sweden’s, where inflation expectations are anchored to the target, the 
unemployment rate would rise in the case of sub-target inflation. This could lead to an 
increase in the household debt ratio, calculated relative to (reduced) disposable income. 
Similarly, a generalised drop in inflation could hinder macrofinancial adjustment and make 
restoring competitiveness more difficult in monetary union countries, which could only 
adjust by means of internal devaluation. In this case, lower inflation across the area, in the 
presence of downward price and wage rigidities, would raise the probability of this 
adjustment having to be made via increased unemployment.27
Deflation, defined as a persistent and widespread decline in price levels, can have even more 
serious consequences, particularly if it is the result of a negative demand shock28 and is 
accompanied by a de-anchoring of agents’ inflation expectations. As well as causing a drop in 
spending, particularly in the consumption of durable goods and productive and residential 
investment, it entails a redistribution of income from debtors to creditors, disincentivises credit 
intermediation, as a result of the loss value of assets used as collateral, and can lead to a 
downward spiral in prices, output, profits and employment. Ultimately, an environment of 
excessively low inflation, or even deflation, may tend to undermine central banks’ credibility 
and make it more difficult for them to implement countercyclical monetary policy.
Central banks in the developed economies have responded to the low growth and low inflation 
environment with monetary stimulus policies. Official interest rates have remained close to 
zero in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the euro area for over seven years, 
and in some cases deposit rates are also below zero (Japan, the euro area, Sweden, Denmark 
and Sweden). Additionally, central banks have adopted unconventional measures to add extra 
The adverse effects of low 
inflation and its economic 
policy implications 
according to the economic 
literature
25  It should be recalled that only import prices of products in the basked used in core inflation are included.
26  See, for example, Blanchard et al. (2015).
27  See, for example, Banco de España (2015).
28  If deflation is the result of a positive supply-side shock (an improvement in productivity, increased 
competition in product markets or more abundant or cheaper inputs), it will be accompanied by increases 
in income and output.
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stimulus. In particular, this has meant expanding their balance sheets by buying financial 
assets, and adopting a policy of forward guidance, outlining the future course of monetary 
policy. Asset purchase programmes result in an expansion of central banks’ balance sheets, 
and therefore an expansion of the monetary base. However, as financial institutions have 
largely held voluntary reserves with the central bank, very little of the increase in the monetary 
base has been passed on to monetary aggregates, the money multiplier having reduced 
markedly.29 However, it is not easy to evaluate the degree of expansion of monetary policy in 
an environment in which the equilibrium real interest rate has fallen.30
As regards the risks of the current situation, monetary policy-makers in some countries 
have expressed contrasting positions. Thus, some members of the Federal Reserve think 
that keeping official interest rates low poses a significant risk to financial stability and 
increases the risk that the effective lower bound on interest rates could become a constraint 
on monetary policy and force central banks to resort to unconventional measures if they 
need to introduce additional stimulus.31 Conversely, other members32 consider the risks of 
premature monetary policy normalisation to outweigh those of waiting, as there is a limited 
range of tools available to stimulate growth when interest rates are close to the effective 
lower bound, whereas conventional instruments exist to control inflationary pressures. 
The difficulties of conducting monetary policy in this environment have triggered a lively 
academic debate, with a variety of different proposals. Some authors, such as Blanchard et 
al. (2010), Ball (2014) or Williams (2016), have suggested raising the central bank inflation 
target to allow more scope for action and to reduce the likelihood of reaching the lower bound 
for official interest rates in periods of low inflation in the wake of adverse shocks.33 By contrast, 
it has been argued that changing the nominal anchor could lead to heightened uncertainty 
and that it may subsequently prove difficult and expensive to establish the anchor at the new 
level. Other authors have proposed measures to overcome the lower effective lower bound 
on official interest rates, such as negative interest rates on physical cash,34 although these 
proposals raise a number of logistic and behavioural issues. Some academics have suggested 
the possibility of introducing fiscal stimulus paid for with permanent increases in the money 
supply (an approach referred to as “helicopter money”) so as to avoid generating expectations 
of higher future taxation by expanding the public debt [Turner (2015)]. The major risk of this 
proposal is that agents may assume it will be repeated in the future, leading to a situation of 
fiscal dominance and loss of central bank independence. 
The difficulties of further monetary policy innovation have led to an assessment of the 
extent to which other policies could contribute to addressing low inflation. However, there 
are always limits on this support. Some analysts maintain that fiscal policy is the first 
option, particularly in a context of low government borrowing costs, although the high 
debt-to-GDP ratios and restricted fiscal space in many economies seem to limit the 
possibility of recourse to this mechanism. In the area of incomes policy there may be room 
to accommodate wage increases, given the growth in profits as a share of GDP in recent 
years. Structural policies are almost always recommended for their usefulness in facilitating 
29  See Berganza et al. (2014).
30  See, for example, Laubach and Williams (2016).
31  See, for example Yellen (2016) or Reifschneider (2016).
32  See Evans et al. (2015).
33  The 2% target prevailing in developed economies is the outcome of weighing the efficiency costs of positive 
inflation (distortions in adjustments of relative prices and increased uncertainty) against the costs of zero 
inflation (nominal wage rigidity on the downside and the possibility of reaching the effective lower bound). 
Biases in inflation measurement also need to be taken into account. See Bernanke (2002).
34  See, for example Haldane (2015) or Rogoff (2016).
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the allocation of resources to more productive activities and boosting agents’ confidence 
so as to stimulate demand. However, in the short term they can lead to price reductions, 
such that it looks necessary to implement them jointly with demand boosting measures in 
the current context. Finally, some international organisations have highlighted the 
importance of international coordination.35 In any event, it is essential that the authorities 
demonstrate their commitment to fighting deflation by taking all the necessary steps, even 
preventively where necessary [Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)].
The drop in inflation rates witnessed in recent years in the advanced economies, in a 
context of economic recovery and accommodative monetary policies, partly reflects the 
impact of transient factors, such as the slump in commodity prices or exchange-rate 
fluctuations. However, it may also be a response to shifts in the process of setting prices 
and wages that are more structural in nature, leading to inflation’s lower cyclical sensitivity 
to domestic economic slack in each economy, inflation expectations playing a bigger role, 
or the greater importance of global factors. 
This article presents inflation-model estimates based on the Phillips curve. The empirical 
results obtained do not make it possible to corroborate the hypothesis that changes in the 
sensitivity of inflation to some of its determinants can explain this phenomenon overall, 
although they may be relevant in some countries. The absence of conclusive explanations 
may be due to an inappropriate specification of the model, as a result of the existence of 
global factors that are not properly captured, or to issues affecting the measurement of 
some variables (such as inflation expectations or the degree of slack). In any event, these 
difficulties have major implications for monetary authorities, in so far as it is more difficult 
to explain and analyse the behaviour of inflation. 
The negative effects of keeping inflation rates low for a prolonged period may be significant, 
as it can lead to high real interest rates, leading to an excessive tightening of monetary 
conditions. It can also make public and private deleveraging more difficult, and hamper 
competitiveness adjustments in a monetary union by making adjustments more costly in 
output and employment terms. In the most extreme case, if there is a de-anchoring of 
agents’ inflation expectations, there is a risk of falling into a deflationary spiral, with even 
more serious consequences. Moreover, keeping inflation rates below central banks’ 
targets for a prolonged period may undermine their credibility.
In this context, the monetary authorities have had to resort to unconventional measures to 
confront the challenges of low inflation, and more recently, some central banks (including 
the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan) have cut their official interest rates on 
banks’ reserves to negative levels. This has all intensified the debate on the scope for 
action and marginal effectiveness of these measures and the risks they entail. In this 
scenario, many academics consider that it is crucial to support other types of policy, such 
as fiscal policy and structural reforms in order to stimulate growth and inflation.
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